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ABSTRACT 
 
TRADING PREFERENTIALLY: AN ANALYSIS OF GHANA- EUROPEAN UNION 
(EU) TRADE UNDER THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EPA) 
 
By 
This paper investigates Ghana-EU trade under the new Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA). The study seeks to examine the influence of the EPA on trade from the Ghanaian 
perspective. Using qualitative methods, focusing on review of trade literature from Eurostat, 
European Trade Commission, and Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry and other relevant 
sources, analysis is made to highlight impacts of the trade agreement on Ghana’s trade 
sectors. Trade Data from 2005 to 2015 has been utilized in making analyses. The study finds 
that although the agreement has improved measures aimed at trade facilitation and in 
extension services trade, it is posing negative effects to trade in goods. Inability of Ghanaian 
producers to compete with European imports threatens the industry. Also, the exclusion list 
of Ghana is inadequate in protecting agricultural trade, especially in the absence of tariff 
measures. Finally, a regional EPA is likely to worsen Ghana’s competitive position in the 
regional market. Taking these findings together with the decreasing attractiveness of the EU 
market for Ghanaian exporters, the paper recommends a review of the terms of the EPA. The 
study also recommends enhanced commitments and efforts from the EU (aid) to help 
transcend the tariff losses and other adjustment costs associated with the EPA.  
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Preferential Trading Agreement, Standstill Clause, General System of 
Preferences, Exclusion List, ECOWAS. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
Hailed as the new form of trade partnership between the European Union (EU) and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) from the onset of negotiations has been confronted with disagreements.1 
The EPA, aimed at safeguarding the preferential market access of the ACP countries 
to the EU Market which was previously granted under the Lomé Convention and Cotonou 
Agreement. However, this agreement changes the non-reciprocal market access to the EU 
(ACP- specific GSP waived from GATT under the Lomé Convention) to a reciprocal Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA).2 This implies that the ACP countries are required to open their 
markets to EU imports. Further market opening in new areas including investment, services 
etc. grants the EU market access in these areas of the ACP country markets. 
Disagreements among ACP countries on the extent of market access granted and 
implications of the EPA on the development of regional markets, effects on trade competing 
sectors of the ACP states and other implications on the developmental process of states, 
amongst other factors has led to a slow pace of the agreement taking effect in many ACP 
countries. 
                                                          
 
1 The EPA negotiations since 2002 has been confronted with internal challenges among ACP member countries. 
These disagreements revolve around arbitrary timelines imposed by the EU negotiators as well as intense 
demonstrations by stakeholders against signing the agreement. January 7th- 8th marked a period of intense 
demonstrations in several African country capitals, with protestors in Dakar, the Senegalese capital numbering 
over 50,000. The disagreements and challenges further revolve around perceived inherent disadvantages 
associated with the agreement and refusal of some African countries to negotiate. For more information, see: 
Mohammed, O.A.G (2016) The EU- Africa Economic Partnership Agreement: Any Way Out? International 
Affairs and Global Strategy. Vol 45. http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/view/31022 
2 Hinkle, L., Hoppe, M., & Newfarmer, R. (2005). Beyond Cotonou: Economic Partnership Agreements in 
Africa' in Trade. Doha, and Development-A Window into the Issues. 
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This study examined the policy implications of the EPA on Ghana, one of the earliest 
African countries that initialed the agreement in June 2014. It examined the EPA’s 
implications on exporters to the EU market, trade competing sectors of Ghana and its overall 
implications on trade between Ghana and the EU (Ghana’s second largest trading partner).  
Analyses examined whether the EPA addresses fundamental challenges facing Ghana, such 
as weak productive capacities, and the implications of opening Ghana’s service industry.  
1.1.  Background of Study 
Motivations for the EPA began from the need to find a WTO compatible trade 
agreement between the EU and ACP countries. The non-reciprocal trade deal i.e. the Lomé 
Convention, was operated under a waiver from the WTO (WTO waivers are required to 
depart from the MFN principle and grant preferential access to developing economies before 
the Enabling Clause was established as a permanent waiver).3 However, this waiver was 
challenged by Latin American banana producers, who argued that the EUs trade preferences 
were neither restricted to LDCs nor available to other eligible developing countries. 
Recognising these arguments, the WTO granted the EU its last waiver at the Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Doha. This waiver was extended to December 2007, thus raising 
the need to negotiate a new trade regime between both partners. This motivation together 
with the EU’s new trade strategy influenced the move towards a reciprocal trade agreement. 
The Cotonou Agreement, concluded in June 2000, was intended to provide a 
framework for transition, that is, from the Lomé Convention to the EPA. This transitional 
agreement was to enable ACP countries to negotiate a trade agreement that is compatible 
                                                          
 
3 The EU required a waiver to grant preferential access to ACP countries, as the Lomé Agreement did not meet 
requirements for a GSP.  For more information on the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements, please see: Curran, L., 
Nilsson, L., & Brew, D. (2008). The Economic Partnership Agreements: Rationale, Misperceptions and Non‐
trade Aspects. Development Policy Review, 26(5), 529-553.   
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with WTO rules, before the deadline of the last waiver in December 2007. The ACP 
countries thus started negotiations in September 2002, working towards reaching a new trade 
deal i.e. the EPA. The ACP countries accordingly started negotiations based on regional 
groupings .i.e. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African 
Development Community (SADC), East African Community (ECA) and the Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) amongst others. However, differences in 
the economic conditions of regional countries .i.e. LDCs and developing countries, coupled 
with differences in their exports to the EU market posed challenges. The ability of the LDCs 
to continue enjoying market access granted under the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) while 
maintaining their tariffs on EU products, and the unwillingness of regional oil exporters to 
lose their tariff margins negatively affected regional negotiations.4 
In addition to the challenges faced during the negotiation process, there were strong 
criticisms from stakeholders on the ability of the EPA to address developmental challenges 
that were faced by ACP states. 5  In Africa, these criticisms revolved around perceived 
disadvantages inherent in the trade agreement. Questions surrounding the ability of African 
negotiators to conclude satisfactory deals in the interest of the continent, as well as perceived 
arbitrary timelines set by the EU towards signing the agreement further eroded the confidence 
of stakeholders.6 All these challenges led to a significant number of African countries failing 
to sign the EPA. 
                                                          
 
4 For more information on the likely effects of the EPA on ACP countries, see the work of Busse and Grobmann 
that discusses the impacts and hesitations of ACP countries to sign the agreement.  
Busse, M., & Großmann, H. (2004). Assessing the Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreement on 
West African Countries (No. 294). Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA). 
5 For in-depth view on the challenges of the EPA and stakeholder perceptions, see the OECD’s document 
entitled: EU-Africa Trade Relations: The Political Economy of Economic 
Partnership Agreements. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/dev/38780784.pdf on October 18th 2016.   
6 Goodison (2007) examines the EPA from the perspective of the EU. He asserts that the EUs push towards 
internal trade reform, aimed at achieving deeper liberalization at bilateral levels, as against difficulties in the 
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Notwithstanding these challenges, Ghana, in an attempt to protect market access for 
businesses concluded an interim EPA in October 2008, and later signed the agreement on 
July 2014 (ratified on July 2016). This makes Ghana one of the few countries exposed to the 
effects of this change from a preferential market access to a reciprocal market access.  
Considerable number of studies have been conducted into the effects of the EPA on ACP and 
African economies. Mc Kay, Milner & Morrissey (2000) examined welfare impacts of the 
EPA on East African economies. They argue that the possibility of lower import prices will 
translate into lower consumer prices and hence positive welfare effects for consumers.7  
Other existing literature on the EPA focuses on regional studies. These research 
policy papers include studies conducted by scholars such as Hinkle and Schiff (2004), Busse 
and Grobman (2004, 2007), Karingi et al (2005), Goodison (2007), De la Rocha (2007) and 
Heron (2011). All these writers attempted to demonstrate challenges posed by the EPA to 
regional integration, and fiscal revenues of ACP countries. Thus, these analyses present a 
negative outlook on the EPA, a perception that reinforces the negative criticisms from 
stakeholders. Although literature on the EPA is extensive, conspicuously limited are studies 
that examine how the EPA is likely to affect individual countries. This gap is likely to stem 
from the limited number of countries that have signed unto the agreement and the limited 
duration of the agreement coming into effect in some of these countries. Thus the need to 
study the impacts the agreement is likely to have on individual signatory countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
WTO multilateral motivated the EPA. He asserts that this deeper integration through binding agreements led to 
push by negotiators, regardless of capacity of ACP negotiator capacities, as well as setting arbitrary timelines. 
For more, see: Goodison, P. (2007). EU trade policy & the future of Africa's trade relationship with the 
EU. Review of African Political Economy, 34(112), 247-266. 
7 McKay, A., Milner, C., & Morrissey, O. (2000). The Trade and Welfare Effects of a Regional Economic 
Partnership Agreement. Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of 
Nottingham. 
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This research examined and describes the impacts of the change from a GSP to a 
reciprocal trade relation (EPA) on Ghana’s trade with the EU. The research shifts the focus 
from generalizations on sub-regional effects, to how it specifically relates to a signatory 
state .i.e. Ghana. Additionally, the research focused on how the EPA addresses fundamental 
challenges facing Ghana, such as weak productive capacities, as well as the implications of 
opening Ghana’s service industry to the EU. To achieve these aims, the study specifically: 
a. Examined trends in Ghana’s trade with the EU before and after signing the EPA 
b. Analysed the impacts of a change from a unilateral to a reciprocal trade agreement 
c. Examined ways in which the EPA affects export and import sectors of trade 
In order to achieve these objectives, the paper answers the following research questions: 
a. What are the differences in the change from a GSP to a reciprocal trade agreement? 
b. What potential trade benefits are Ghana likely to gain from the trade agreement 
with the EU? 
c. What challenges are posed by the EPA to Ghana- EU trade? 
 
1.2.   Hypothesis 
H1:  The Economic Partnership Agreement positively improves Ghana’s trade with the EU. 
H2:  The Economic Partnership Agreement negatively affects Ghana’s trade competing 
sectors. 
 
 
 
 
1.3.  Methodology 
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This research relied heavily on secondary data. Research papers on the topic (EPA), 
Ghana-EU trade data and other significant data bases were explored. The European 
Commission trade databases, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and other international trade data bases were consulted.  
Trade data from respective ministries in Ghana, including the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Ghana Exports Promotion Council etc. were utilized for this study. Research works 
from these institutions added additional dimension to the work. 
These documents were subjected to content analysis to demonstrate how the EPA has 
affected trade patterns between the EU and Ghana. The content analysis focused on trade 
competing sectors of Ghana such as the agricultural sector, service and industries. These 
sectors were chosen because they are most likely to be affected by the trade agreement .i.e. 
likely to suffer trade losses. 
The remainder of the research is organised as follows. Chapter two examined existing 
literature on the research as well as explored the conceptual framework underpinning the 
study. This demonstrated previous work on the subject, as well as highlighted the gap in 
existing literature. Chapter three focused on Ghana- EU trade under the EPA. The trade 
agreement and its tenets, as well as relationship with trade sectors etc. are examined in this 
chapter.  Chapter four discussed the challenges the EPA imposes on Ghana’s trade with the 
EU and other trade partners. This chapter also detailed the benefits to trade under the EPA, 
not previously discussed in the preceding chapters. The final chapter summarised the major 
points discussed, concludes the research, as well as offers policy recommendations. 
 
1.4.   Significance of Study 
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The significance of this research lies in its efforts to identify the policy implications of 
a shift from non-reciprocal to a reciprocal trade agreement. It attempts to offer deeper 
understanding on trade policy implications and how these effects directly relate to Ghana-EU 
trade. Thus the work can be a policy reference to stakeholders in the trade industry. 
The research seeks to advice on how the EPA will affect trade, and how to mitigate 
these challenges. A work of this nature can also be used as a reference material for trade 
policy students, as well as individuals who desire to undertake further research on Ghana-EU 
trade, and the EPA in general. The work can also be used as policy reference material for 
other West African countries in the process of EPA negotiations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two broad discussions: 
i. The Literature review – this encompasses discussions on two major areas .i.e. part 
one (General issues on regionalism) and part two (Specific issues on the ACP-EU 
relations and the EPA) 
ii. The Theoretical framework. 
 
2.1.    General Issues on Regionalism  
The debate on the importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) have been 
divided. Whereas one camp of scholars .i.e. supporters of bilateralism argue that PTAs 
increase trade and wealth between countries, and improve welfare benefits of member 
countries, the other camp .i.e. multilateralism and its proponents are opposed to the 
proliferation of PTAs. This camp’s major argument suggests that, proliferation of PTAs 
undermine efforts at multilateralism .i.e. collective trade liberalization through negotiations at 
the WTO. As such, the deadlock of the current Doha Development Round trade negotiations 
has been argued by the proponents of multilateralism to be partly caused by efforts at 
bilateralism. 
Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger in An Economic Theory of GATT examined the 
foundations of the international trade system through its basic principles of reciprocity and 
non- discrimination, and how these principles relate to PTAs. Working within a general 
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equilibrium trade model, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) argued that “preferential agreements 
undermine GATT’s ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes”.8 While conceding in 
their conclusion that Customs Unions (CU) built on principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination in a set of circumstances can be compatible with multilateralism, the authors 
demonstrated fundamental incompatibilities between FTAs and multilateralism. The authors 
using models, highlighted that trade agreements are preferred by governments if it allows 
them to transcend inefficient terms-of-trade restrictions that characterise unilateral tariff and 
trade policies.9 
Using the general equilibrium model and simulations of government trade policy 
objectives, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) demonstrated governments’ ability to shift costs of 
interventions to external trade partners. GATT’s rules on reciprocity and non-discrimination 
have been highlighted by the authors to encourage participation of weaker countries in 
international trade negotiations, since these principles reduce fears of exploitation by stronger 
trade partners. Thus, GATTs rule-based approach to trade negotiations, contrasts with power-
based approaches which may not satisfy political motivations of tariff setting in the weaker 
bargaining country.10 
2.1.1 Arguments on Multilateralism  
 
Krueger (1999) argued against the proliferation of PTAs. She asserted that although 
PTAs are likely to increase trade between the constituent parties, non-members face a higher 
risk of rising barriers to the markets of the PTA members. Krueger (1999) cited an example 
of Mexico’s trade discrimination against non-NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
                                                          
 
8 Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999). An Economic Theory of GATT. American Economic Review, 215. 
9 Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) demonstrate using empirical models how PTAs are preferred by 
governments if the welfare benefits and political considerations enable them transcends costs associated with 
unilateral trade policies. For in-depth analysis of their observations, see  
10 Op. cit. Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999). 
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Agreement) members in 1998, against the backdrop of the 1994 financial crises. Krueger’s 
assertions corresponds to similar arguments against bilateralism .i.e. the fear of trade 
fragmentation resulting from the proliferation of PTAs. Thus, the possibility of trade 
fragmentation, diversion and trade wars amongst rival trade blocs lies beneath the arguments 
for multilateralism. 
In extending the arguments on multilateralism, the economist Jagdish Bhagwati 
contended that although PTAs may create higher trade volumes among member countries, it 
can negatively lead to higher losses for members coming from higher initial tariffs. This loss 
occurs since PTAs redistribute tariffs from new members to pre-existing members with 
perhaps lower tariff margin.11 Bhagwati further argued that ineffectual regulation of PTAs 
enables trade discrimination against non-members. In Free Trade Today, Bhagwati argued 
that although GATT Article XXIV attempts to protect non-members of PTAs from trade 
losses including discrimination; the nature of such losses he asserted, together with a lack of 
an effective discipline leads thirds parties to PTAs to suffer trade discrimination.12 Bhagwati 
further described the proliferation of PTAs as a Spaghetti Bowl, with PTAs sprawling to form 
a messy maze of preferences, each with different Rule of Origin (ROOs) and their related 
challenges. 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger in their book The Dangerous Drift to 
Preferential Trade Agreements further highlighted the challenges with PTA proliferation. 
The authors contended that the arbitrary and multiple Rules of Origin amongst diverse PTAs 
arise due to differences in external tariffs and often serve protectionist interests, thus reducing 
supposed benefits in PTAs. Bhagwati and Krueger (1995) further suggested that new entrants 
                                                          
 
11 Panagariya, A., & Bhagwati, J. (1996). The economics of preferential trade agreements. AEI Press, 
Washington D.C. 
12 Bhagwati, J. N. (2003). Free Trade Today (No. 2003). Princeton University Press. New Jersey. 
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to FTAs join at less favourable terms, while diluting the concessions made by existing 
members.13   
Richard Cooper corroborates the assertions of Bhagwati and Krueger. He indicated 
that the technicality and arcane details of Rules of Origin often hinder a detailed 
understanding of such rules.14 Thus, these rules often give rise to and become protectionist 
policies aimed at restricting trade. Cooper (1994) further argued that by discriminating 
against trading partners through the formation of RTAs with complex ROOs, a larger group 
of displaced traders are created, for each PTA that is formed. 
 2.1.2. Proponents of Bilateralism/ Regionalism 
 
Advocates for PTAs .i.e. regionalism basically argue that PTAs are the building 
blocks of multilateral trade liberalization, and promote deeper liberalization amongst 
countries. Thus, PTAs are promoted due to their ability to encourage trade liberalization 
between and among the constituent members. 
Chomo (2002) contended that PTAs are beneficial to developing countries by opening 
access to the larger markets of developed countries. She further argued that PTAs including 
non-reciprocal tariff reductions (GSPs) extensive phase-in periods and other safeguard 
measures in PTA negotiations between developed and developing countries enable the 
protection of trade competing sectors of the latter. 
Furthermore, Chomo (2002) suggested that developing countries have potential 
welfare gains in negotiating PTAs with industrialized countries. She asserted that this to be 
                                                          
 
13 Bhagwati, J. N., & Krueger, A. O. (1995). The dangerous drift to preferential trade agreements. AEI Press. 
Washington D.C. 
14 Richard N. Cooper. Comment in Schott, J. (2004). Free trade agreements: US strategies and priorities. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
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possible due to the ability of PTA negotiations to correct the high inefficiencies and 
distortions that negatively affect trade in developing countries. Reducing these trade barriers 
as well as improvements in transparency and other measures will lead to welfare gains for 
developing countries. In building upon Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer’s article Does 
Trade Cause Growth? Grace Chomo argued that export led industrialization represents a 
potential growth approach for developing economies, as such, access to the markets of 
industrialized economies through PTAs can be beneficial to development of the developing 
country.15 
In Regional and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Complementary means to open 
markets Edward L. Hudgins offered an extension to Chomo’s arguments on the utility of 
PTAs in liberalizing multilateral trade. Hudgins contended that bilateral trade liberalization 
through PTAs are necessary even if there is the possibility of trade diversion. He opined that 
bilateral liberalization can be used as a starting point to promote multilateral negotiations 
which involve larger numbers of members, with higher tendencies for deadlocks in 
negotiation process.16 
Arguing from a similar position, Fred Bergsten in Open Regionalism proposed that 
FTAs should be structured around the concept of open regionalism; a concept that aims at 
building regional trade amongst ‘natural trade partners’ .i.e. states which by way of 
geography are inclined to trade amongst each other. This concept to Fred Bergsten should be 
                                                          
 
15 Frankel, J. A., & Romer, D. (1999). Does trade cause growth?. American economic review, 379-399. 
16 Hudgins, E. L. (1995). Regional and multilateral trade agreements: Complementary means to open 
markets. Cato J., 15, 231. 
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the guiding principle in forming PTAs. He further suggested that trade investments should be 
based on MFN Principle to minimise trade diversion as well as free rider problems.17   
Schott (2004) asserted that the ability of FTAs to reduce/eliminate trade barriers on 
‘substantially all the trade’ through deep reforms to members’ trade policies, makes PTAs 
desirable. He contrasts the pace of reforms negotiated through PTAs, and the slower pace of 
incremental reforms associated with multilateral negotiations. To Schott (2004) the relative 
ease of concluding trade liberalization amongst small group of countries, as against the 
substantial barriers and deadlocks at the WTO Ministerial, increasingly makes FTAs 
preferred by countries.18  
Lusztig (2004) cited the benefits of FTAs such as fostering economic interdependence, 
creating incentives for investment as well as improving welfare benefits, through its ability to 
widen consumer choices. However, the author noted that these benefits are not evenly 
distributed, especially in terms of developing country situations. Furthermore, he noted that 
FTAs can dislocate local businesses through increased competition arising from the entering 
of foreign firms into the local market. This argument relates to the EPA and its effects on 
trade competing sectors of Ghana. Lusztig (2004) however concluded that free trade 
agreements have become the dominant strategy pursued by countries that aim at improving 
aggregate trade gains at a fast pace.19  
In sum, the proponents of regionalism argue on the improved ability of constituent 
members of PTAs, especially developing countries to gain access to the markets of 
                                                          
 
17 MFN Principle in international trade states that trade concessions granted to one Member are applied 
immediately and without conditions to all other Members. See GATT/WTO Article I for further explanation. 
18  Schott, Jeffrey J., Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System? Cited in Schott, J. J. 
(2004). Free trade agreements: boon or bane of the world trading system. Free trade agreements: US strategies 
and priorities, 3(11). 
19 Lusztig, M. (2004). The limits of protectionism: Building coalitions for free trade. University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
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industrialized countries, as basic justification for the need of PTAs. This access gained 
through reduced barriers, the proponents argue can be ‘locked-in’ thus increasing the 
prospects of trade liberalization. This potential of PTAs makes them the building blocks for 
multilateral trade liberalization. These deep commitments by members towards liberalization 
together with the welfare benefits asserted by proponents to be inherent in PTAs lay at the 
foundation of arguments for bilateralism. These literature and their arguments are later 
examined in relation to the EPA and Ghana-EU trade.  
2.2.  Specific Issues on ACP- EU and the EPA   
 
Lecomte and Bernard (1998) investigated the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries trade relationship with the European Union.20 These trade relations, the authors 
assert, extended back to the period of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
signing of the Yaoundé I agreement (1963-1969). This agreement which aimed at improving 
the infrastructure of 49 ACP countries, became the foundation of future trade agreements 
such as Yaoundé II (1969- 1975) and later, the Lomé I - IV agreements and additional 
protocols.  
2.2.1.  The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)  
 
Koné (2010) in his analysis suggested that the EPA became necessary for three main 
reasons. First, the need to improve economic relations between the EU and ACP countries 
motivated the creation of the trade agreement. According to Koné (2010), previous years of 
unilateral trade preferences achieved negative results among ACP countries. 21  
                                                          
 
20 Lecomte, H. B. S., & Bernard, H. (1998). Options for Future ACP-EU Trade Relations. European centre 
for development policy management.  
21 Koné, S. (2010). Economic partnership agreement between West Africa and the European union in the 
context of the world trade organization (WTO) and the regional integration process. Journal of Economic 
Integration, 104-128 
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Marginalization of ACP countries in world trade, a fall in Foreign Direct Investments from 
the EU to ACP countries, and other negative trade indicators demonstrate these negative 
trends in trade relations between the two partners.  
Secondly, Koné (2010) contended that the need to bring the trade relations between 
the ACP countries and the EU into conformity with WTO laws necessitated a shift to an FTA. 
In addition, Koné (2010) indicated that, the unwillingness of the EU to extend similar trade 
preferences to other developing countries outside the ACP group of countries infringed upon 
WTO laws. This infringement was challenged by Latin American countries as a contradiction 
of ‘WTO Article I’ (Most favoured Nation-MFN). Thus the necessity to create WTO 
compatible laws was influential in the negotiations towards an EPA.22 This argument has 
been further reinforced by Roy (2005) when he asserted that agitations from Latin American 
banana producers against EU trade preferences to ACP countries under the Lomé Agreement 
created the need to negotiate WTO compatible trade agreement.23 Kone (2010) further cited 
the EUs desire to continue preferential trading regimes with the ACP countries as a latent 
motivation towards the EPA. 
2.2.2.  European Union’s Perceptions on the EPA  
 
     Goodison (2007) examined the future of Africa’s trade with the EU in the context of 
EU’s wider trade strategy. His work analysed the EPA by reviewing the trends and processes 
in the negotiation process, and how they were affected by wider EU trade rules and strategy. 
He argued that the EPA in the context of the EUs new trade strategy focuses on pursuing 
                                                          
 
22 Op. cit. Koné, S. (2010). 
23 Roy, S. (2005). African Development and ACP-EU Partnership. Economic and Political Weekly, 521-523.  
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trade liberalization. 24  According to the EU Trade Commission, the growth of the EU is 
directly linked to the markets of the trade partners. Attempts at transforming the EUs trading 
partners, with a focus on trade liberalization therefore becomes the core premise of the new 
EU trade strategy. Goodison (2007) asserted that the new trade strategy lays emphasis on 
non-tariff barriers, as against traditional barriers to trade. Thus, government procurement, 
protection of intellectual property rights, and curtailing government intervention in market 
prices are the major tenets of the new trade strategy.25 
    According to Goodison (2007), the EUs trade strategy seeks to go beyond the WTO 
by promoting issues rejected in the multilateral forum, through bilateral trade agreements. 
Thus, the focus of the EPA’s on ‘WTO Plus’ issues such as government procurement, trade 
in services and intellectual property rights. The Trade Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TCDA) with South Africa, for example, was used to bilaterally push the 
argument for ‘Geographical Indications/ Geographical Destinations of Origin’ before taking 
the issue to the multilateral era. Similarly, the writer argued that the EUs drive for EPAs 
became entangled with issues on trade facilitation, investment, competition and government 
procurement (Singapore issues) after such issues were rejected at both Cancun (September 
2003) and Hong Kong (December 2005) WTO Ministerial. Thus, the EPAs became the EUs 
main avenue for building consensus among countries before reintroducing such ‘WTO Plus’ 
issues within the multilateral fora.26 
     Goodison (2007) criticized the EUs trade strategy as one-sided. He asserted that 
although the EU is pursuing the removal of trade barriers in markets which it is well placed to 
                                                          
 
24 Goodison, P. (2007). The future of Africa's trade with Europe: ‘New’ EU trade policy. Review of African 
Political Economy, 34(111), 139-151.  
25 Goodison, P. (2007). The future of Africa's trade with Europe: ‘New’ EU trade policy. Review of African 
Political Economy, 34(111), 139-151 
26 Ibid  
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compete, similar efforts are not pursued within the EU. The reforms of the EUs Common 
Agriculture Policy, which have seen ‘trade-distortive’ payments to farmers persist despite 
attempts to remove them, are cited as examples. Goodison (2007) further questioned the 
ability of the wider EU trade strategy in promoting the structural transformation of ACP 
economies. According to Goodison (2007), African trade negotiators’ objectives must be 
reflected in the EPA, and if not, the trade agreement may fail to deliver on expectations.  
2.2.3.  Effects of the EPA  
 
Critics of trade liberalization in Africa assert that the underdevelopment and 
marginalisation of Africa require improvement in institutional capacity to precede any 
attempt towards development (Foroutan & Pritchet, 1993; Coe & Hoffmaster, 1999; Rodrik, 
1998; Charlton & Stiglitz, 2007).27,28 Extending the argument made in these policy studies 
opens up questions on the ability of the EPA to achieve its intended targets.29 
Charlton & Stiglitz (2007) argued that although trade liberalization enhanced the 
growth prospects of Asian countries, Asian growth can nonetheless be argued to have been 
preceded by institutional reforms. Siroen (2000) thus called into question literature that 
established relationship between trade opening and economic growth.  
                                                          
 
27 Rodrik, D. et   Subramanian, A. (2003), “La Primauté des Institutions: ce que cela veut direet ce que cela 
ne veut pas dire”, as cited in Koné, S. (2010). Economic partnership agreement between West Africa and 
the European union in the context of the world trade organization (WTO) and the regional integration 
process. Journal of Economic Integration, 104-128  
28 Coe, D. and A. Hoffmaister, A. (1999), “North-South Trade: Is Africa Unusual?”, Journal of African 
Economies, as cited in Koné, S. (2010). Economic partnership agreement between West Africa and the 
European union in the context of the world trade organization (WTO) and the regional integration process. 
Journal of Economic Integration, 104-128.  
29 Foroutan, F. and L. Pritchett (1993), “Intra-Sub-Saharan African Trade: Is It Too Little?”, Journal of 
African economics, vol. 2, pp.74-105. 
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In relating these arguments to the EPA, the fundamental solution to African 
development requires an improvement in institutional framework to achieve growth. Thus, 
the prevailing institutional incapacity of ACP countries threaten any potential gains from the 
EPA trade agreement.  
In a similar study, Karingi, Lang, Oulmane, Perez, Jallab, & Hammouda (2005) 
examined the EPA and how it affects trade relations between the EU and ACP countries. The 
authors sought to evaluate how the EPA fits into the WTO rules, particularly article XXIV of 
GATT and article V of GATS. The writers revealed an ambiguity with respect to 
interpretation of the WTO articles and how this affects the trade agreement.  
In examining the EPA, Karingi et al. (2005) raised some challenges facing African 
countries with regards to implementing the agreement. Overlapping regional groups, which is 
a problem that involved African countries being members of more than one regional 
economic group and its associated challenges are among the issues raised. Other problems 
include limitations with revenue mobilization and productive capacities of ACP countries.  
Karingi et al. (2005) further sought to analyse the welfare impacts of the EPA on ACP 
countries in general. They asserted that there exists a possibility of budgetary constraints 
resulting from customs revenue losses. They further contended that the EPA is likely to divert 
trade among African countries. This problem has the potential to negatively influence 
regional integration. Opening up African markets to the EU further suggested the possibility 
of negative effects on Africa’s industrialization process. In addition, Karingi et al. (2005) 
argued that the stiff competition from EU, which will occur as a result of the reciprocal 
removal of trade barriers raises the possibility of pushing indigenous products out of the 
market.  
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In their study of the trade and fiscal impacts of the EPA, Busse and Grobmann (2007) 
asserted a negative impact of the EPA on West African countries. The writers acknowledged 
that the loss of potential export revenues from trade liberalization is likely to have negative 
effects on signatory countries. 30  They further argued that the EPA in facilitating trade 
between the West African region and Europe raises the possibility of negatively reducing 
intra-regional trade.  
However, Busse and Grobmann (2007) acknowledged the fact that the availability of 
the EU to finance development improves the prospects of growth through the upgrade of 
institutional structures. The ability of the EU to support this institutional transformation 
however remains to be tested. According to the writers, the EPA should not be celebrated as 
an agreement in the interest of Africa.  
In a similar research on the EPA, Brenton, Hoppe and Von Uexkull (2007) argued a 
contrasting view about the ability of the EPA in addressing the developmental challenges 
facing ACP countries.31 In their study of the EPAs effects on East African economies, the 
writers asserted that the EPA framework failed to take into consideration the development 
challenges of ACP economies. This pessimistic view stems from the institutional incapacities 
in ACP countries, as well as the losses to be incurred in implementing the EPA. According to 
Brenton et al. (2007), the structural and institutional limitation in ACP countries such as weak 
tax system, low productive capacities, high levels of unemployment amongst others limit the 
revenue base of ACP governments. Brenton et al. (2007) argued that this limitation has led to 
                                                          
 
30 Busse, M., & Großmann, H. (2007). The trade and fiscal impact of EU/ACP economic partnership 
agreements on West African countries. Journal of Development Studies, 43(5), 787-811.  
31 Brenton, P., Hoppe, M., & von Uexkull, E. (2007). Evaluating the Revenue Effects of Trade Policy  
Options for COMESA Countries: the Impacts of a Customs Union and an EPA with the European Union. 
Paper prepared as part of the World Bank–COMESA Joint Work Program for Regional Integration and EPA 
negotiations. Washington, DC.  
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a high dependence on revenue sources such as exports and imports revenue (custom duties). 
The removal of this vital source of revenue through the implementation of the reciprocal free 
trade agreement is likely to cripple government revenue base. The writers opined that this 
singular problem is likely to have chain effects, with negative consequences in diverse sectors 
of ACP economies.  
Analysis of these policy papers show that academic work on the EPA is limited to 
regional studies. Thus, a country-focused study of the impacts of the EPA is needed to 
examine how the trade agreement affects signatory countries operating under distinct 
economic conditions. 
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2.3.     Theoretical Framework 
 
 This section examines preferential trading arrangements and related concepts. This is 
to give the reader an introduction to the concept of PTAs, as well as their effects on the 
international trading system. 
2.3.1 Preferential Trading Arrangements 
 
Regional/ Preferential Trading Arrangements (R/PTAs) as a concept underpins this 
research. As such, the motivations for RTAs, basic tenets, features and concepts related to 
preferential trading amongst states becomes the framework used to explain Ghana’s trade 
relations with the EU. 
Panagariya (1999) defines PTAs as “agreements between two or more countries in 
which tariffs imposed on goods in the member counties are lower than goods produced 
outside.” 32  Although PTAs collectively refer to diverse forms of preferential trading, 
Panagariya further elaborates on different levels of trade integration. 
These include: 
1. Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs): This refers to agreements where constituent 
countries agree to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all the trade, 
while maintaining individual tariff/ trade policies on external countries. E.g. the EPA 
2. Customs Union (CU): This refers to countries eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
preferences as in an FTA, as well as establishing a common tariff and trade policy for 
non-member countries. E.g. Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
                                                          
 
32 Panagariya, A. (1999). The regionalism debate: an overview. The World Economy, 22(4), 455-476. 
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3. Common Markets: Countries in this trade arrangement agree to merge their 
economies in addition to satisfying the requirements of a CU. Thus, constituent 
countries eliminate barriers to capital and labour flow across national borders.  
4. Economic Union: Member countries in this PTA adopt common macro-economic 
policies, through the merging of the economies of the member countries. A common 
currency together with related economic institutions are established to regulate 
economic and trade relations. E.g. The European Union (EU)33 
 
In addition to the above preferential (reciprocal) trading arrangements are non-
reciprocal preferential trading, granted under the Enabling Clause. These involve developed 
countries granting preferential/special treatment to developing and least developed country 
trade. These preferences are often granted under the General System of Preferences, often to 
all eligible countries. However, there are also special waivers/ regional agreements that 
reflect these preferential treatments. Examples include the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) granted by the United States to sub-Saharan African countries, and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) etc. 
2.3.2. Developing Countries and PTAs 
 
Central to this research is the relationship between an industrialized economic bloc – 
EU and a developing country- Ghana. Thus, how are North-South trading relations influenced 
by PTAs? Classical trade theorists including Viner (1950) assert a trade diversion effect of 
PTAs vis-à-vis third countries. He demonstrated that the complementary nature of trade 
                                                          
 
33 Ibid. 
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relations .i.e. production of raw materials and intermediate goods by the South, and industrial 
goods by the North dominates and affects developed-developing country trade. 
Other scholars including Collier and Gunning (2000), Piazolo (2001) and Venables 
(1999) criticized Viner’s postulations, arguing that North-South FTAs are beneficial due to 
different factor endowments of the respective parties. Thus, ability of South to export labour 
intensive goods, while benefiting from cheap capital intensive imports represent a division of 
labour as well as stimulating growth.34 These arguments represent a factor endowment view 
of developed-developing country PTAs. 
On the other hand, South-South PTAs can be argued to enhance negotiation capacities 
and bargaining positions of developing countries that band together through PTAs. Weak 
bargaining positions of developing countries vis-à-vis their industrial counterparts and trade 
blocs create a vulnerability for developing countries during multilateral negotiations and 
individual PTAs. However, this disadvantage can be transcended through formation of South-
South groups that give leverage (in theory) to the position of developing countries, as well as 
enable them gain concessions from the North. Negotiating such PTAs can further enhance 
compromises among group of developing countries on sensitive trade issues, which can later 
provide platform for multilateral liberalization. 
PTAs between North-South countries are argued to foster Sequencing Bargaining 
Effects. This is where industrial partners in PTA negotiation push for WTO Plus issues to be 
included in PTAs with developing countries. These PTAs with the North pursue higher trade 
standards, as deeper integration levels are sought on issues that are stalled within WTO 
Ministerial .i.e. Singapore Issues are partly infused in the EPA. According to Bhagwati 
                                                          
 
34 Bui., T. G. (2004). Emerging FTA Approach in East Asia and Policy Implications for Vietnam. Thesis 
submitted to the KDI School. 
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(1993), although negotiating such issues multilaterally among South countries simultaneously 
can be profitable, hegemonic powers (the North) stands to gain more in bargaining 
sequentially with South countries, through individual PTAs.35 Thus, picking one vulnerable 
country and moving to the next through plurilaterals offer greater payoffs, as the benefits are 
not available to all WTO members (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996). Such sequential 
bargaining further allows sensitive issues stalled in multilateral fora to be locked-in through 
negotiating PTAs. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
 
35 Bhagwati, J. (1993). Regionalism and multilateralism: an overview. New dimensions in regional 
integration, 22, 51. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GHANA- EU EPA 
3.0.   History of Ghana- EU Trade Relations 
 
 Ghana-EU Trade relations officially dates back to 1975 during the signing of the 
Lomé Convention.36 Prior to this agreement, the Francophone African countries established 
trade cooperation with Europe under the Yaoundé Convention (1963). Expiration of this 
agreement together with other developments including United Kingdom joining the European 
Community (and the need to incorporate her former colonies into the trade relations) together 
with ACP countries decision to negotiate as a bloc, led to the Lomé Convention I.  
 This agreement that underpinned Ghana-EU trade witnessed several revisions 
including in 1979 (Lomé II) where development assistance was added to cushion ACP 
countries from the effects of commodity price fluctuations and other negative effects of trade. 
Further revision of the agreement in 1984 (Lomé III) introduced a focus on promoting food 
security and self-sufficiency amongst ACP states. The final Lomé Convention revision in 
1989 (Lomé IV) introduced democratic principles, human rights and rule of law etc. as 
factors in EUs trade with ACP countries including Ghana.37 
 Whereas the Yaoundé Accords that preceded the Lomé Conventions attempted to 
establish a reciprocal trade relations, the ACP countries in negotiating (Lomé Conventions) 
as a group succeeded in securing a non-reciprocal trade agreement. Thus, Ghana benefitted 
from favourable access to the EUs market while it was under no obligation to treat EU goods 
                                                          
 
36 Although trade relations dates back to precolonial periods where the Portuguese landed on the shores of 
Ghana and started trading relations. This relations further continued during colonial periods, where Ghana, a 
colony of Great Britain engaged in commodity trade with its colonial master. However, official trade is often 
dated to the Lomé Agreements.  
37 See Review of the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the European Union by 
CEPA, Ghana. Cited in cepa.org.gh/research papers/Ghana74.pdf. This paper analyses the inconsistencies in 
the Lomé Agreements and the need for change. 
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in a similar way; hence the consistent application of MFN tariffs to EU trade. However, 
Ghana- EU trade under Lomé IV (from 1995) was conducted under a waiver the EU secured 
from the WTO as the preferential arrangement violated GATT/WTO principles; especially as 
non-ACP developing countries and LDCs were not offered similar privileges. This inherent 
inconsistency, together with the EUs desire to bringing trading relations into conformity with 
WTO rules necessitated a shift towards the EPA, first through the Cotonou Agreements that 
secured the last waiver from the WTO (from June 2000 to December 2007).38 In this vain, the 
Cotonou Agreement stipulated that “ACP- EU agree to remove progressively barriers to trade 
between them and enhance cooperation in all areas relevant to trade in line with Article 
XXIV of GATT”.39 
3.1.    The Ghana-EU EPA 
 
 The EPA is not only compatible with GAT/ WTO principles on preferential 
trading (Article XXIV) but encompasses additional areas of trade including services, 
environment and government procurement etc. deepening trade relations between the two 
partners. Ghana- EU EPA negotiations started in September 2002, with December 2007 
stated as deadline. Although Ghana started negotiations with the EU as a group i.e. under 
ECOWAS, contentions on the agreement, together with other market access differences led 
Ghana to individually sign an agreement with the EU on December 13 2007.40   Prior to 
Ghana signing the EPA, only the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) signed the agreement as 
a group. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana were the only West African country to also sign an interim 
                                                          
 
38 ACP/EC: The Cotonou Agreement, 2001, Internet Posting: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement_en.htm.  
39 Ibid 
40 The EPA was initially to be negotiated under regional groupings, but contentions arising from market access 
and development status (.i.e. LDC, developing country etc.) together with other regional differences inhibited 
progress. However, some regional groups including CARIFORUM succeeded at negotiating as a group.  
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EPA as other regional countries were unprepared to sign the agreement.41 See Table 1 below 
for negotiation blocs for the EPA. 
Table 1 The EPA Negotiating Groups Prior to Ghana Signing an Individual EPA (iEPA) 
 
Source: Overseas Development Institute. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Where 
We Are. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2588.pdf 
 
Among the regional groupings within the ACP, West Africa remains the most 
important to the ACP- EU trade, accounting for 40% of trade relations. Within this region, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire together account for 90% of the regions’ trade with the 
                                                          
 
41 EPA negotiations were very contentious among ECOWAS countries due the diverse development status of 
states, as well as market access differences. For more on this contentions and related issues, see the Overseas 
Development Institute paper “the Economic Partnership Agreements; where we are”. 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2588.pdf  
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EU. 42 Trade between Ghana (and West Africa) and the EU is dominated by chemicals, 
industrial goods, vehicles and machinery imports from the EU, while exports to the EU is 
dominated by Cocoa (from Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire). Production of oil by Ghana in 2008 has 
added crude exports as another dimension of trade. Other agricultural products including 
bananas, fisheries etc. and mining products including gold and diamond, to a lesser degree.43  
Table 2  The European Union's Exports to Ghana (Ghana's EU Imports) 
 
Source: Official Website of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana44 
 
 
                                                          
 
42 For more on this see the website of the European Union Delegation to Ghana trade documents. Retrieved 
from: 
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/eu_ghana/t
rade_relation/bilateral_trade/regional_trade/index_en.htm  
43 For more on Ghana’s trade statistics with the EU, see the website of the European Delegation to Ghana, at: 
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/eu_ghana/t
rade_relation/bilateral_trade/regional_trade/index_en.htm  
44 For more on Ghana-EU trade statistics, see: 
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/eu_ghana/t
rade_relation/bilateral_trade/index_en.htm   
30 
 
 
Table 3 Imports of the European Union from Ghana (Ghana's EU Exports) 
 
Source: Official Website of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana45 
3.2. Why the Economic Partnership Agreement? 
 
In an European Commission Green Paper (1996) the commission detailed three 
shortcomings of the Lomé Agreements that to the EC necessitated a shift to the EPA. These 
include: 
a. Unilateral character of preferences and its effects on creating a highly protected 
and non-competitive ACP economies. 
b. An absence of an emphasis on ‘good governance’ and institution building; and 
c. Substantial supply side challenges of ACP economies which increasingly 
inhibited diversification of their product base and exports.46 
                                                          
 
45 For more on Ghana-EU trade statistics, see: 
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/eu_ghana/t
rade_relation/bilateral_trade/index_en.htm  
46 Acheampong,  T. (2016). A Review of the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the 
European Union. MPRA Paper, Retrieved from: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/66232  
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Notwithstanding these arguments by the EU, critics cite asymmetric negotiation terms as 
well as perceived negative effects of the EPA, thus calling for a repudiation of negotiations. 
This led to questions that in the absence of the EPA, what options can Ghana pursue to 
underpin her trade with the EU. Analysis of available EU trade policies for developing 
countries reveal three alternatives. These include: 
a. The Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme of the EU: This trade policy applies to 
goods from least developed ACP countries that are allowed a duty-free and quota-free 
entry into the market of the EU (in exception of arms and ammunitions). However, 
this option is not available to Ghana (since Ghana is not an LDC). 
b. The General System of Preferences (GSP) and the GSP+: This trade scheme offers 
slight tariff reductions to developing countries. Products covered under the scheme 
offers lower than MFN tariffs, but its failure is that it is not contractual, hence 
Ghana’s market access is not guaranteed. The GSP+ offers substantial or complete 
tariff removal on all products covered by the scheme. The GSP+ however applies to 
only developing countries that are signatories to specific international conventions on 
human rights, good governance and environment etc. 47  Thus Ghana cannot be 
migrated to this scheme, if it had failed to sign an EPA.48  
 
Absence of an EPA would have left the GSP as the only viable option for Ghana-EU 
trade, as Ghana’s status as a lower middle income, together with not satisfying the GSP+ 
requirements eliminate the alternatives discussed above. See the figure below for a 
comparison of trade under the diverse options on 2005 level .i.e. EU tariff levels before EPA. 
                                                          
 
47 For further information on the GSP and GSP+ see, dialogue box later in this chapter. 
48 Nigeria applied to be migrated to the GSP+ but was rejected on grounds of not satisfying the criteria. 
Currently, Cape Verde enjoys trade under this scheme. 
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Table 4 Conditions Facing Ghana's Trade in the Absence of an EPA 
 
Source: Action Aid- Ghana (2013). 
 
From the table above, at the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement in 2007, Ghana 
could have continued exporting 67% (two-thirds) of her exports to the EU under MFN tariffs, 
which were duty-free. This MFN covered Ghana’s major exports including hardwood timber, 
cocoa beans, gold etc. The GSP which Ghana qualified for could have enabled another 5% of 
exports to enter the EU market duty free.49 This leaves 28% of exports, which can be argued 
to be the reason for signing the EPA. However, these group of products form the emerging 
non-traditional export sector of Ghana, around which the country’s industrialization policy is 
structured. Not signing the EPA will thus make them very uncompetitive in the EU market.  
 Products that constitute this 28% facing high tariff in the absence of the EPA together 
with their export shares include: fresh vegetables (2-8%), pineapples (2.3-5.8%), preserved 
tuna (18-20%), cocoa butter and paste (4-6%), plywood, aluminium, cassava and bananas etc. 
                                                          
 
49 For more on the composition of Ghana’s exports at the expiration of the Cotounou Agreement, see: Patel, M. 
(2007). Economic partnership agreements between the EU and African countries: Potential development 
implications for Ghana. Realizing Rights, The Ethical Globalization Initiative. 
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Thus the EPA was essential to maintaining their export competitiveness in the EU market. A 
full list of these items at the time of signing the EPA is below. 
 
Table 5 Ghana's Main Exports to the EU and Respective Tariff Rates Under the EPA 
and GSP, 2014 
  Exports total value EUR million 
Tariff rates under 
the EPA 
Tariff rates under 
GSP 
Prepared or preserved tunas 
and skipjack 111.4 0.0 20.5 
Bananas, fresh (excl. plantains) 30.2 0.0 132 €/t 
Cocoa paste 150.2 0.0 6.1 
Cocoa butter, fat and oil 153.5 0.0 4.2 
Cocoa powder 23 0.0 2.8 
Pineapples 22.6 0.0 2.3 
TOTAL EUR 491 Million 0.0 Various 
Source: EUROSTAT and the TARIC databases. 
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Table 6 Ghana's Exports to the EU that are affected by High Tariffs without an EPA 
(during period of negotiations) 
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3.3.    The EPA and Welfare Implications 
 
Literature on welfare implications of PTAs is divided. Issues including effects on 
government revenues (especially for developing countries) as well as their capacity to lock-in 
positive reforms are highlighted as contributing to welfare. Furthermore, trade creation and 
trade diversion effects complicate analysis of PTA welfare effects. However, experts agree 
the ability of PTAs to influence welfare depends to a large extent on the economic structure 
of a member country as well as its economic size. 
De Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1992), Schiff (1997), and Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996) asserted PTAs to have a welfare reducing effect when examined in relation to the 
overall multilateral trade system. However, individual member trade liberalization resulting 
from PTA reforms may be positive. Notwithstanding this, non-competitive behaviour, 
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multiple rules of origin problems etc. has led multilateralists to argue against the shift 
towards PTAs.50 
The EPA as it stands now offers a duty-free and quota-free access to Ghana’s trade 
with the EU, for an unlimited period of time. Ghana in return is undergoing a gradual 
liberalization of 75% of EUs exports to Ghana, over a 15 year period. The asymmetric market 
opening (.i.e. 100 % of EU at the time of signing compared to 75% for Ghana between 2008 
and 2022) can be argued as reflecting the different developmental stages and market sizes etc. 
of the two partners. Ghana in liberalizing 75% of her trade with the EU reflects similar 
agreements the EU negotiated with Chile and South Africa, where ‘substantially all the trade’ 
was interpreted to mean at least an 80% liberalization (which the EU initially pursued with 
Ghana).51  
Welfare implications of the EPA in Ghana, it should be noted depends on the capacity 
of the country to implement reforms to boost production, the liberalization schedule and 
impacts on fiscal revenues, as well as how trade competing sectors, agriculture etc. are 
affected by the EPA. The country’s ability to utilize market access under the agreement also 
affects welfare. These sectors are analysed below. 
3.4.    The EPA and Tariff Liberalization 
 
Closely related to the welfare effects are tariff elimination and their effects. It is 
important to note that the asymmetric market opening highlighted above affords Ghana the 
flexibility to protect import sensitive sectors, while preserving fiscal revenues as well as 
putting in place frameworks against revenue losses. Prior to the EPA with the EU, Ghana 
                                                          
 
50 Op. cit. Bui (2004) 
51 For more on disagreements on negotiation schedules and contentions, see Patel (2007). 
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embarked upon tariff liberalization, with average MFN tariffs falling from 17% in 1992 to 13 % 
in January 2000. Consumer goods had highest applied tariffs pegged at 20% (which were the 
highest of Ghana’s tariffs). Other categorizations include a 0% - 5% MFN tariff on raw 
material and capital goods, and 5% - 10% on intermediate goods. 13.5 % of tariffs lines 
enjoyed a 0% duty.52  
Table 7 Ghana's Liberalization Schedule53 
 
Source: Bilal, S and Stevens, C. (2009) 
 
Ghana has between 2008 and 2022 (15 years) to liberalize 75% of EU imports 
(constituting 81% of tariff lines). This liberalization started in January 2013 where 22.6% of 
items constituting 995 tariff lines were liberalized. Another 44.1% of EU imports are in the 
process of liberalization (.i.e. between 2015- 2017). The items constituting the highest tariff 
lines of 20% are due for liberalization from 2021 to 2022. In sum, by the end of 2016, 66.7% 
of EU exports to Ghana would have been liberalized. The fiscal impacts of this liberalization 
are analysed later in the chapter. 
                                                          
 
52 For more information on Ghana’s tariff lines see: WTO (2001) Ghana Trade Policy Review, document 
WT/TPR/S/81, p. ix 
53 For a list of EU exports to Ghana that were liberalized, see the appendix of this work. 
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The Market Access Order- It is instructive to note that Ghana negotiated an exclusion list, 
comprising items that are not to be liberalized notwithstanding the EPA .i.e. the remaining 25% 
of Ghana’s trade that is not liberalized. This list is referred to as the Market Access Order of 
Ghana (MAO), comprising a list of sensitive items that if liberalized, may cause negative 
welfare implications. This list encompasses 1,038 goods, among which include agriculture 
products (31%), plastics and its products (7.1%), meat and edible meat offal (5.8%) etc. 
Fruits and vegetable preparations (5.4%) are all excluded. Overall, 85% of the excluded items 
fall within Ghana’s highest MFN applied tariffs (.i.e. 20% tariff), while 10% fall with tariff 
band of 10%.54 Below is a breakdown of the exclusion list, with a comprehensive list in the 
appendix of this research. 
Table 8 Summary of Ghana's Exclusion List 
 
Adapted from: Action Aid Ghana (2013) 
 
 
                                                          
 
54 For a comprehensive review of Ghana’s liberalization schedule etc. see: European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, & London Overseas Development Institute. (2009). The interim Economic Partnership 
Agreements between the EU and African states: contents, challenges and prospects. S. Bilal (Ed.). ECDPM. 
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3.5.     The EPA and Ghana Government Revenues 
 
A major source of Ghana Government revenue is import tariff, which has been 
seriously compromised through trade liberalization under the EPA. Prior to signing the EPA, 
a study conducted by the European Centre for Development Policy Management indicated a 
heavy reliance of ECOWAS countries on import tariffs (.i.e. 14.5% of revenues and 2.5% of 
GDP). Ghana’s dependence on this was estimated at 15.5% of government revenue.55 
However, the EPA’s effect on government revenue has declined in line with a 
decreasing EU imports since the liberalization came into effect from January 2013. (.i.e. 27% 
imports at 2008 to 20.7% in 2015).56 See diagram below, and appendixes for complete trade 
statistics between Ghana and the EU. 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext – Statistical Regime 4 
                                                          
 
55 For more on earlier estimates of the EPA on Ghana and ECOWAS countries revenue, see: ECDPM (2006) 
Overview of the Regional EPA Negotiations: West Africa-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement, In Brief, No. 14B – November 2006  
56 European Union, Trade in goods with Ghana 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122461.pdf  
Table 9 European Union Trade with Ghana (2005- 2015) 
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In line with this decline in trade, tariffs revenues were unstable, before the effects of 
the EPA set in (.i.e. tariffs peaked at USD $ 450 million in 2011, before dropping to USD 
$ 341 million). However, the EPAs effects exacerbated the tariff decline since January 2013, 
as revenues fell from USD $310.9 million in 2013 to USD $278 million in 2016. This 
according to an Action Aid Ghana report indicated a 12% fall in import revenue.57 
The rate of the decline and its effects on welfare remain complex. This is because the 
current trend of Ghana- EU trade decline raises the possibility of such trade losses been 
replaced by other regions (.i.e. Asia and Africa), which will in effect be conducted under 
MFN tariffs, compensating for tariff revenue losses. Another complication arises as this trade 
replacement alone cannot compensate tariff losses, especially since substantial tariff lines 
under Ghana- EU trade (10%- 20% tariff lines) remains to be liberalized post 2017 .i.e. 2021 
- 2022. This liberalization will likely further erode government revenues. Projected revenues 
indicate that tariff revenues in 2022 under the EPA will be at USD $70.31 million as 
compared to USD $242.1 million in the absence of the EPA (and trade continues to fall).58 
See below for tariff revenue loss projections. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
57 Action Aid- Ghana (2013). Analysis of Socio-economic Development and Policy Options under the Interim 
EPA Regime with the European Union. Retrieved from: 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/actionaid_ghana_research_-
_ghana_under_interim_epa_and_implications_for_socio-economic_development.pdf  
 
58 Ibid  
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Adapted from: Action Aid Ghana Report (2013) 
The figure above demonstrates projected revenue losses from the signing of the EPA 
to the period of complete liberalization of EU trade (2022). The estimates assert a USD $88, 
575 million revenue loss per-annum between 2008 to2022. From 2017, Ghana stands to lose 
USD $202.8 million due to liberalization of higher tariff lines. A cumulative analysis puts 
total loss of government import revenues from 2008 to 2022 at USD $1, 126, 807. This loss 
only relates to direct forgone revenues under the EPA, hence other indirect losses associated 
with tariff elimination are potentially higher.     
3.6.    Revenue Loss and Consumer Welfare 
 
A related issue to welfare is whether tariff eliminations/ government revenue loss 
translates into price relief for consumers. Trade experts argue that this revenue impacts can 
be experienced by consumers if EU exporters transfer tariff elimination to price of products, 
or if Ghanaian importers transmit tariff eliminations to goods. Without these transfers to 
consumers, tariff eliminations are unlikely to be felt by Ghanaian consumers. Experts contend 
that a less competitive market such as Ghana experiences the latter, hence tariff eliminations 
are unlikely to be reflected in consumer goods (but instead accrue in additional profits to the 
Table 10 Tariff Revenue Estimates, with and without an EPA 
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importer or the producer).59 However, other reports including IMANI Ghana (2014) assert a 
7.4% average savings on consumer commodities if EPA tariff eliminations are passed on to 
the consumer.60 This will represent a significant welfare gain. 
3.7.    The EPA and Trade Diversion 
 
In addition to revenue losses analysed above are ‘trade diversion effects’ of the EPA 
and their impacts on government revenue. The current EPA raises the possibility of Ghanaian 
producers switching imports from competitive third country suppliers to the EU in order to 
benefit from preferential tariffs (0%). This diversion of trade further increases the prospect of 
revenue losses, as trade can be switched from MFN tariff suppliers (with associated revenue) 
to the EU. This situation holds negative trade implications on world trade in general, and has 
been argued by trade experts including Bhagwati (2008) as undermining world trade. 
3.8.       The EPA and Ghana’s Manufacturing and Industrial Sector 
 
An issue of major welfare concern is how the EPA affects Ghana’s fragile industrial 
sector. Although specific data on Ghana’s industrial competitiveness is lacking, structural 
constraints faced by producers, makes the current competition with EU products asymmetric. 
Using the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) reports as a basis of 
analyses, the nature of competition faced can be assessed. UNIDO’s Composite Index of 
Industrial Performance (CIP) 2016 measures export quality, manufacturing value-added and 
industrialization intensity etc. to rank countries. It is instructive to note that the EU countries 
rank in the top quintile (Germany- 1st, Netherlands 8th etc.) whereas Ghana ranks in the 
                                                          
 
59 Busse, M., Borrmann, A., Großmann, H., & Hamburg, J. (2004). The impact of ACP/EU Economic 
Partnership Agreements on ECOWAS countries: An empirical analysis of the trade and budget effects. Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg. 
60 For more on this, see: IMANI Ghana (2014). 
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last/bottom quintile (119th).61 This demonstrates the competitiveness of both trade partners, as 
well as the level of competition Ghanaian producers’ face. 
Existing effects of the Structural Adjustment induced liberalization and associated 
cheap Chinese and Far East imports have already crippled industries including Ghana’s 
textile and garment industry. This makes the current liberalization under the EPA contentious 
among stakeholders, who argue that liberalization contrasts government promises of 
supporting and promoting growth in the sector.62 
Although industry stakeholders’ position .i.e. imposition of additional trade barriers 
negates the tenets of the EPA (‘standstill clause’) and Ghana’s WTO commitments in general, 
systematic address of existing structural and logistical constraints can begin to improve 
Ghana’s productive capacities. Ghana’s imports from the EU is dominated by industrial 
machinery and agricultural inputs necessary for Ghana’s industrial growth, hence imposition 
of trade restrictions may have negative implications. 63  Thus, improving the competitive 
ability of Ghana’s industries with a view to developing economies of scale will be vital to 
improving welfare under the EPA. 
                                                          
 
 61 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2015) Industrial Development Report 2016, The Role 
of Technology and Innovation in Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development, Vienna. 
62 For more on this, see Action Aid Ghana (2013). 
63 A report by IMANI Ghana demonstrated that a large percentage of liberalized products from the EU are 
industrial machinery, and have no direct competition with Ghanaian products, and in no danger or posing 
welfare threats. For more on this report, see IMANI Ghana. 
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Table 11- EU- Ghana Trade Product Breakdown 
 
Source: Acheampong, T., Omane-Achamfuor, M., & Tawiah, N. A. (2014) 64 
3.8.1.   Ghana’s Non Traditional Exports (NTE) and the EPA: An issue of major 
significance is how the EPA affects Ghana’s non-traditional exports .i.e. a group of inter 
mediate exports that together accounted for the 28% of exports that risked higher tariffs and 
hence the EPA. These products represents the fastest growing trade export sector, with 
revenue contributions over USD $2 billion in a 2012 report cited by IMANI Ghana.65  
The sector’s growth from the table below quadrupled between 2001 and 2012 .i.e. 
$500 million to $2 billion, demonstrating its capacity to lead Ghana’s industrial drive. This 
further explains Ghana’s willingness to sign the EPA and protect its competitiveness, as 
products including Tuna faced EU MFN tariffs of 20.50% (without the EPA). Rules of origin 
granted under the EPA, together with expectations of investments in the sector holds much 
                                                          
 
64 Acheampong, T., Omane-Achamfuor, M., & Tawiah, N. A. (2014). The Economic Partnership Agreement 
(Epa) Between Ghana And The European Union: A Developmental Game Changer?. 
65 IMANI Ghana (2014) IMANI Report: Evidence-based support for Ghana to ratify the EPA 
Retrieved from: https://www.modernghana.com/news/535491/1/imani-report-evidence-based-support-for-
gh.html.  
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promise for welfare improvements. However, this improvement remains dependent on a 
complexity of factors, including the industry remaining competitive in EU and ECOWAS 
markets. 
Table 12 Growth of Non Traditional Exports (NTE) from Ghana 
 
 
3.9.     The EPA and Trade in Agriculture 
 
Ghana- EU trade before the inception of the EPA saw 35% of EU imports entering 
Ghana duty-free. This leaves 40% of EU imports to be liberalized under Ghana’s 75% 
liberalization schedule. EUs exports to Ghana that attracted the highest tariff bands .i.e. 20% 
are agricultural products, considered by Ghana to be very sensitive. 66  Thus, significant 
percentage of trade in these products remained carved out under Ghana’s exclusion list 
(MAO), protecting the sector from EUs cheap agricultural exports. This list includes goods 
such as sugar, cereals, chicken and flower, tobacco, frozen fish and beer etc.  
                                                          
 
66 IMANI Ghana (2014) IMANI Report: Evidence-based support for Ghana to ratify the EPA 
Retrieved from: https://www.modernghana.com/news/535491/1/imani-report-evidence-based-support-for-
gh.html.  
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The exclusion list enables agricultural trade with the EU to remain protected. In 
relation to this, the EUs 100% liberalization also excluded trade in sugar and rice from initial 
liberalization in 2008, opting for a gradual liberalization of these two products from 2013. 
With reference to welfare, small holder agriculture represents a significant percentage of 
Ghana’s trade with EU. The effects of the EPA on this sector transcends tariffs, to include 
sensitive issues such as employment, poverty reduction, food security and development of 
local industries etc. Thus, carving- out of the sector has had little impact on welfare, 
especially as the ‘stand-still clause’ deprives government of the use of tariffs to protect 
nascent industries. This risk to the agricultural sector’s competitiveness can be observed from 
the consistent increase in EU poultry export shares (%) to Ghana. Notwithstanding the 20% 
tariff on these products before the EPA, the EUs exports have consistently increased, 
displacing competitors (United States, Brazil etc.) from the market. 67  Trade policy 
instruments including tariffs can be argued as necessary for welfare benefits.    
A divisive issue in the agricultural trade relates to the EUs sensitivity to agriculture 
and in extension its subsidy program. On this issue, Ghana and the EU agreed to raise levels 
of transparency, with the EU reporting actual subsidy measures and their legal framework 
and other related information etc. to their Ghanaian counterparts.68  
3.10.     Service Trade under the EPA 
 
Ghana’s service sector contributes over 50% of GDP. This highlights the importance 
of the sector to growth. The EPA opens up important services including banking and 
insurance, tourism, construction and telecommunications etc. Specific data on the effects are 
                                                          
 
67 IMANI Ghana (2014) IMANI Report: Evidence-based support for Ghana to ratify the EPA 
Retrieved from: https://www.modernghana.com/news/535491/1/imani-report-evidence-based-support-for-
gh.html 
68 Ibid. 
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lacking due to the agreements current (early) stage of implementation. Prior to the EPA, 
Ghana unilaterally liberalized her service trade, with commitments in maritime transport, 
telecommunications etc. as part of the structural adjustment program.69 
Industry perceptions on the EPAs effects on the service sector has been generally 
positive, with increasing participation of foreign firms expected to further improve the sector. 
The proliferation of foreign firms within the telecommunications sector for example can be 
argued to have improved quality of service. Similar experience is observed in the 
proliferation of new banking institutions within the financial sector.70 Capacity improvement 
and related effects on competition, consumer welfare etc. are expected to remain the major 
benefits under the EPA within the service sector. 
Table 13- 
Percentage Shares of Economic Sectors in Ghana 
 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service71 
                                                          
 
69 WTO (2001) Ghana Trade Policy Review, document WT/TPR/S/81 
70 Patel M. (2007) 
71 Ghana Statistical Service (2014). Statistics for Development and Progress (Gross Domestic Product 2014) 
Retrieved from: http://statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/GDP/GDP_2014.pdf  
21, 21% 
23.5, 23% 
55.5, 56% 
Percentage of GDP (2015) 
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Source: Ghana Statistical Service72 
 
3.11. The EPA and Additional Issues 
 
Rules of Origin: This provision can be described as asymmetric as it grants generous 
provisions to Ghana compared to trade under the Cotonou Agreement. The EPA allows 
accumulation of inputs from regional countries which are EPA members to qualify for entry 
into the EU as Ghana products. Currently, this provision only extends to Cote d’Ivoire, but 
imminent ratification of EPAs by regional countries will enable inputs to be sourced and used 
to boost productivity. The accumulation provision further ensures joint productive ventures 
among regional countries, and can also be described as an added advantage of trade under the 
EPA. 
Trade Facilitation: Currently, mechanisms to streamline custom procedures and other 
border issues represent immediate efforts at reducing logistical constraints facing trade. 
                                                          
 
72 Ghana Statistical Service (2016). Statistics for Development and Progress (Gross Domestic Product 2016) 
Retrieved from: 
http://statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/GDP/GDP2016/Revised_Annual_2015_GDP_September%202016%20Edition
.pdf.  
Table 14 Sector Distribution and Growth in Ghana (Showing Service Sector Growth) 
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Efforts at addressing investment challenges .i.e. reducing bureaucratic procedures, 
introduction of electronic clearance of goods, and improvement of harbour logistics etc. 
promises further gains towards improving trade in Ghana. 
Government Procurement: This aspect of the trade deal has yet to be analysed as there is 
yet to be a competitive bidding process from EU firms on government projects under the 
EPA clause. However, it is worthy to note that colonial linkages, tied- aid conditions etc. has 
enabled EU firms to enjoy competitive advantages in the winning and execution of diverse 
government contracts, especially in infrastructure provision, where EU firms boast superior 
expertise and resources. This past linkages informs the position of this author that not much is 
likely to change in the award of contracts, especially since EU firms have long been 
operational in Ghana. The government procurement aspect of the EPA may improve project 
delivery and quality in the long run, a situation that will be beneficial to trade and 
development. 
Development Cooperation: Different provisions in the agreement make emphasis for 
development assistance; through trade facilitation, capacity enhancement of Ghanaian 
industries etc. Programs including the National Adaptation strategy to aid banana exporters to 
the EU market, the 2013-2016 Banana Accompanying Measures (to improve conditions on 
the farm and supply logistics), the Trade Related Assistance and Quality Enabling Program 
(TRAQUE) etc. together with other contributions to trade related funds represent an attempt 
by the EU to promote trade under the EPA.73 These measures, although laudable, fall short of 
expectation from the EU in addressing EPA challenges. 
                                                          
 
73 For more on EU aid towards the EPA, see the website of the European Union Delegation to Ghana: 
http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/eu_ghana/t
rade_relation/epa/index_en.htm.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE EPA 
 
4.0.    Introduction 
    “It became then obvious to me that 
between two advanced nations, a free competition must necessarily be advantageous to both if they 
were upon the same level of industrial progress; and that nation unhappily far behind as to industry, 
commerce and navigation must above everything put forth all its strength to sustain a struggle with 
nations already in advance”. 
(pg. v-vi) Friedrich List, 185674 
 
Mareike Meyn’s paper for the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is among the 
early critics of the EPA as not being a comprehensive trade agreement. The author asserted 
that almost all EPA signatories risk substantial economic costs, a result from hastily drawn 
and coerced trade agreement. Meyn (2008) further draws on the agreement’s failure to take 
regional integration into cognizance among a host of other challenges the EPA poses to 
trade.75  
To gain a better comprehensive view of the effects, pro- EPA benefits will be 
assessed against the challenges the agreement presents to Ghana-EU trade. 
4.1.     Challenges to the Ghana- EU EPA 
 
As indicated earlier, the EPA negotiations were fraught with challenges before key 
details were finalized. This led the ODI to declare in 2006 that “at present, neither supporters 
nor opponents of EPAs can demonstrate convincingly that the other is wrong”. 76  This 
acknowledgment further reinforces perceptions of the agreement leaving Ghana worse off, a 
                                                          
 
74 List, F., & Colwell, S. (1856). National system of political economy. JB Lippincott & Company. 
75 Meyn, M. (2008). Economic Partnership Agreements: A ‘historic step towards a ‘partnership of 
equals’?. Development Policy Review, 26(5), 515-528. 
76 Stevens, C. (2006). Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Where we are. ODI Briefing Paper, 4. 
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position that reflects Friedrich List’s assertions quoted above (on disparities between trade 
partners and effects on trade). 
4.1.1. Complications in Negotiating a Comprehensive Regional EPA 
 
A primary challenge arising from the current EPA Ghana negotiated is complications 
in negotiating a regional agreement. Ghana (and Cote d’Ivoire) in negotiating individual 
EPAs create the challenge of merging the details of the individual EPAs with a unified 
ECOWAS EPA. Determination of tariff elimination schedules, liberalized goods, and other 
related aspects of such an FTA become messy, especially as Ghana has already began 
liberalization of her market, whereas other ECOWAS countries are yet to begin any such 
process. Furthermore, ability of Ghana to retain her exclusion list, together with how any 
comprehensive regional agreement will affect trade is yet to be analysed. Thus Ghana’s EPA 
not only affects integration, but worsens an already complicated trading system fraught with 
individual country difficulties. 
4.1.2. The EPA and Regional Integration 
“Our advantage is regional integration. Can the EPA help us 
integrate our markets? If anything, it will stall us. I don’t think EPA 
is a priority for Africa”77 
Onkundi Mwencha (Deputy Chairperson of African Union (AU) Commission 2008-
2016) 
 
In examining the regional implications of the Ghana-EU EPA, two arguments can be 
made. Ghana as already mentioned in signing an individual EPA has raised challenges to a 
comprehensive regional agreement. However, from a different point of view, integration with 
the EU comes at the expense of progress towards regional integration. ECOWAS has been in 
                                                          
 
77 Exchange, T. (2012). Economic Partnership Agreements—Still Pushing the Wrong Deal for Africa?. Briefing 
paper produced in collaboration with Traidcraft Exchange (UK), Comhlamb (Ireland), AITEC (France), and 
Oxfam Germany and WEED (Germany). Retrieved from: http://www.stopepa.de/img/EPAs_Briefing.pdf.  
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the process of forming a Customs Union to boost intra-regional trade, as well as develop 
infrastructure. Individual EPAs like Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire take away from this progress 
towards deeper regional trading. 
Not only did the agreement continue to pit LDCs (can benefit from the EBA) against 
non- LDCs (GSP, GSP+ or EPA) but any imposition of similar market access arrangements 
on countries with different economic conditions risks collapsing regional integration attempts. 
Secondly, in negotiating an individual EPA, Ghana risks prioritising her trade with Europe 
over her regional countries, and this spells negative implications on regional trading. The 
greatest danger lies in negotiating a comprehensive EPA. In this case, Ghana’s trade in the 
regional market (the ECOWAS market) risks competition with cheaper EU exports. Regional 
Integration is facilitated through trade, and Ghana’s precedence in prioritizing trade with 
Europe risks negative backlashes. 
4.1.3. The EPA and Industrialization 
“We cannot continue to export a narrow range of products and import a 
broad range of finished goods on our way to development. The hard work of 
industrialization must be done”78 
                                 Benjamin W. Mkapa, former President of Tanzania (2012) 
The period of non-reciprocal trading and associated benefits is over. This was 
emphatically asserted by the European Centre for Development Policy Management that “the 
honeymoon period for Africa is over”. Thus the European Commission’s communique that 
“the EU will take vigorous actions to challenge measures which violate WTO, or bilateral 
rules …more generally the EU will act against the protectionist use of export restrictions by 
third countries” reflect the new trading environment Ghana faces. 
                                                          
 
78 Exchange, T. (2012). Economic Partnership Agreements—Still Pushing the Wrong Deal for Africa?. Briefing 
paper produced in collaboration with Traidcraft Exchange (UK), Comhlamb (Ireland), AITEC (France), and 
Oxfam Germany and WEED (Germany). Retrieved from: http://www.stopepa.de/img/EPAs_Briefing.pdf  
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Civil society’s concerns on the EPA granting the EU unfettered access to Ghana’s 
market reflects the primary challenge that the EPA currently limits policy space through the 
use of protectionist measures. The agreement’s ‘standstill clause’ among other things 
prevents government from raising tariffs to protect sectors that face negative competition.  
Memories of the negative effects of structural adjustment and its requirements on 
liberalization make the pursuit of unfettered trade liberalization (of services, government 
procurement etc.) another challenging issue for civil society. Groups including the Third 
World Network (TWN) argue that the ambiguity in liberalizing “substantially all the trade” 
should have been exploited by Ghana to enable a much limited liberalization with longer 
schedule. 
4.1.4. The EPA and Depreciating Market Access 
 
Concerns have been raised that trade preferences granted to Ghana may rapidly 
diminish and hence unable to offset losses that are incurred. Critics argue that current market 
access privileges enjoyed under the EPA are eroding and subject to diminish within 5-10 
years, especially as the EU continues to negotiate FTAs with other regions. The EUs 
continuous negotiation of additional FTAs, and its interests in the Andean countries, India, 
Central America etc. and other more competitive regions is likely to expose Ghana to stiffer 
competition in the EU market.  
Many of these new regions boast superior productive capacities as compared to Ghana, 
hence making the EU market a less attractive export destination for Ghanaian products. 
However, similar stiff trade challenges are unlikely to be faced in ECOWAS regional markets 
(except with the EU products); a trend that is likely to make the EPA a defunct trade 
agreement with time, while retaining regional markets as more attractive destinations. A 
study conducted by Patel (2007) indicated that a 100% liberalization of the EU market is 
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likely to add less than 1% value to Ghana’s 2007 exports to the EU.79 This shows that no 
meaningful gains in terms of market access is granted by the EPA in the long term.  
4.1.5. Aid for Trade? And Investment 
 
Notwithstanding the EUs promise to link adjustment to the EPA with the EDF, critics 
continue to doubt if these funds can ameliorate current fiscal losses. The argument is made in 
light of the fact that no significant increase in development assistance has been provided 
since the EPA. Funding program under the EDF immediately after Ghana signed the EPA 
(2008-2013) reflected no additional funds in relation to the EPA. This situation raises 
significant concerns on how tariff losses can be transcended.  
Furthermore, the slow and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures associated with 
disbursement of the EDF raises questions on its suitability as the mechanism to disburse EPA 
adjustment funds. Limited capacity in the past has prevented Ghana government from 
obtaining designated funds under the EDF even years after such funds have been 
earmarked. 80 These problems make it imperative for a new aid- for-trade mechanism to 
distribute EPA funds, which is lacking at the moment. 
In the agriculture sector, the Export Development and Agriculture Investment Fund 
(EDAIF) operational weaknesses and slow disbursement of related agricultural funds 
continue to hinder Ghana government’s ability to help farmers adjust to losses incurred in the 
sector.81 It is worthy to note that without supportive investments, trade alone is incapable of 
stimulating growth. This has led critics of the EPA to argue that “without timely, effective 
                                                          
 
79 Patel, M. (2007). Economic partnership agreements between the EU and African countries: Potential 
development implications for Ghana. Realizing Rights, The Ethical Globalization Initiative. 
80 European Commission (EC) DG Development (2004) ‘2004 Mid-Term Review – Ghana’, DG 
Development, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and OCTs, available at 
http://delgha.ec.europa.eu/en/publications/MTR%202004%20Ghana%20-%20Conclusions.pdf  
81 Action Aid- Ghana (2013).  
56 
 
 
and quick disbursement of development assistance for adjustment costs of liberalization; the 
EPA may be unable to provide the necessary framework for growth.”82 
4.2.    Opportunities Provided through the EPA 
 
The EPA is argued to be capable of building sustainable economies, together with a 
supportive regional logistics and supply chain framework to facilitate trade. Decades of 
Ghana depending on non- reciprocal trade, through waivers has failed to reflect any 
substantial growth, but instead an economy structured around commodity trade. Thus, it has 
become necessary to break away from this cycle and develop new trading relations into 
vibrant areas like services, government procurement etc. and related frameworks capable of 
engaging Ghana into the global trade. 
The EPA in unlocking these sectors increases Ghana’s prospects for development through 
trade. 
4.2.1. Investment  
 
Although critics contend that the EPA has yet to demonstrate its capacity in attracting 
investment, it can be argued that opportunities that the agreement opens up Ghana’s banking 
and insurance sectors, telecommunications etc. represent untapped areas of growth. 
Furthermore, the EPA through improvements in border and custom procedures .i.e. 
harmonising of standards and merging of customs related Ghana government agencies to 
facilitate trade etc. continue to position Ghana as an attractive destination of investment.  
Improvements in these sectors are likely to have spill-over effects into other trade related 
sectors. 
                                                          
 
82 Ibid  
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4.2.2. Reduced Trade Shocks 
 
It can be argued that the EPA offers a contractual agreement to trade .i.e. unlike the 
GSP that would have regulated trade, the EPA offers market access based on a contract 
enforceable agreement, hence guaranteeing market access.83 GSP is offered and can be varied, 
based on the preferences of the EU, but the EPA offers stability to market access, while 
giving Ghana the option of challenging trade distorting practices of the EU under the 
agreement. 
4.2.3. Wider Developmental Reforms 
 
  It is worthy to note that the EPA offers benefits beyond trade. The agreement’s focus 
on wider developmental issues including democracy, capacity enhancement, infrastructure, 
labour rights etc. represents the EUs attempt at blending development cooperation with trade. 
The agreement’s focus on eliminating tariffs for example builds on the EUs attempt to wean 
ACP economies off reliance on tariffs, to developing resilient trade structures.84 Assessing 
the EUs focus on bridging infrastructural gaps of ACP economies through the EPA highlight 
the developmental aspects of the EPA.  
 
  
                                                          
 
83 The EBA, and other EU GSPs are granted unilaterally by the EPA and can be altered based on the preferences 
of the EU. The EPA is contractual and negotiated by both parties, and changes to it must be agreed by both 
partners. Thus previous examples of countries attaining a development stage and becoming migrated-off a GSP 
is avoided under the EPA. 
84 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_151010.pdf.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.0.   Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a summary of major findings regarding the EPA and Ghana- EU 
trade. This is followed by the author’s conclusions on the effect of the EPA on trade .i.e. 
whether the agreement is in the interest of Ghana or not. This conclusion is based on the 
findings of the study. The chapter ends with recommendations on how the EPA can be 
leveraged for growth, as well as how its defects can be transcended. 
5.1.   Summary of Findings 
 
Ghana-EU trade relations extended back to precolonial years. Trading under the 
GATT/WTO began in 1975 under the Lomé Conventions (I- IV) that conferred non-
reciprocal access to EU markets. This was followed by the Cotonou Agreement in June 2000, 
as a transition framework to WTO compatible agreements .i.e. the EPA. The EPA provided 
duty-free and quota-free access for Ghana’s exports to the EU, in exchange for a 75% 
liberalization of EUs exports to Ghana over a 15 year period. 
The EPA can be argued to be necessitated from the need to protect 28% of Ghana’s 
export (non-traditional exports) to the EU that would have incurred high MFN tariffs in the 
absence of the EPA. This industry represents a fast growing trade sector and vital to Ghana’s 
industrialization aspirations. This need for protection, together with the EUs argument to 
bring trading relations into conformity with WTO rules explain Ghana’s signing of the trade 
pact. 
The nature of the liberalization schedules, together with Ghana carving-out sensitive sectors 
(agriculture) has dampened the negative effects expected from the agreement. Welfare effects 
of the agreement highlight a steady decline of Ghana government tariff revenues. This is 
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calculated at USD $88,575 per annum. Total direct revenue losses between 2008 and 2022, 
where the final tranche of tariffs are expected to be liberalized is USD $1, 126, 807 billion. 
This is likely to increase given trade diversion effects as well as other trade related effects. 
On welfare effects, the EPAs effects on industry are both positive and negative. 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation’s CPI Index highlights the competitive 
strength of both trade partners. Using this index, Ghana’s industries asymmetric competition 
against EU exports can be assessed. This represents a growing threat to prospects of 
industrialization. However, trade liberalization has positive effects on capital goods 
imports .i.e. industrial machinery, agricultural inputs etc. can be imported by Ghanaian 
industries at 0% tariff. The EPA further provides generous rules of origin, allowing 
accumulation of inputs of products from regional countries to qualify for market entry. This 
is a further boost to industry. 
Analyses further highlighted the increasing growth of Ghana’s service sector that has 
contributed to over 50% of GDP in 2015. The EPA in opening this sector raises the 
opportunity for enhanced competition, with potential welfare gains. Increasing players within 
the once closed banking and finance industry, together with the telecommunications industry, 
with players including Vodafone, Zenith Bank, Stanbic Bank and Société Générale etc. has 
improved these sectors. Similar transformations are expected in line with ongoing 
harmonisation of standards and streamlining of related institutions. 
Within the agricultural sector, findings showed that notwithstanding the Market 
Access Order, EUs cheap imports threaten some products. Increasing imports of poultry and 
its effects on the sector was highlighted. These effects are similar to past disastrous effects of 
liberalization on Ghana’s clothing and textile industry.  
Not regarding these benefits, declining trade between Ghana and the EU, together with 
increasing competitiveness of the EU market represent significant challenges. This problem is 
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likely to extend to the ECOWAS market, especially due to increasing propensity of regional 
countries to ratify an EPA.  
Finally, the agreement has been deemed to be contributing little to FDI inflows. 
Although the EPA is continuously improving sector competiveness, findings reveal it has 
contributed little to FDI, with current inflows attributed to Ghana’s 2010 commercial oil 
exploration. However, since the EU is increasingly importing oil from Ghana, further 
research is needed to analyse how this oil import is related to oil investments. 
 
5.2.   Conclusions  
 
In line with the finding above, I draw the following conclusions on Ghana’s trade under 
the EPA: 
1. Notwithstanding the market access granted under the EPA, there is a continuous 
decline in trade with the EU. This means the EUs market has lost its attractiveness 
due to factors including the CAP, and increasing EU standards. This limitation 
inherently limits market access granted, and hence the utility of the trade pact. 
2. Ghana risks a collapse of indigenous industries in light of increasing competition from 
EU exports. This will have effects on employment, poverty reduction and other 
welfare effects. 
3. The EU has managed to negotiate a better deal due to advantages it stands to gain in 
Ghana’s market. Taking into consideration the few FTAs Ghana has signed, the EU 
faces little competition in Ghana’s market, while holding competitive advantage over 
local firms. In addition to the EU industries’ economies of scale, the EPAs market 
access improves trade gains in general for the EU. 
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4. The carving-out of the agriculture sector is inadequate in protecting the sector against 
EU competition. The ‘standstill clause’ in preventing the use of tariffs to regulate 
trade, restricts government’s policy options in combatting surging EU agriculture 
exports. This poses a risk of negative effects on the sector. 
5. Ghana faces further trade losses in regional markets in light with the pending EU-
ECOWAS EPA. Ghana’s industries currently export to ECOWAS markets, but the 
EU in negotiating EPAs with these countries increases the threat of displacement of 
Ghanaian products. Thus, similar competition effects in Ghana’s domestic market are 
to be expected within the ECOWAS market. This raises the hreat of further losses for 
Ghana. 
In line with the above, the EPA poses negative effects to Ghana’s industrial 
development. Notwithstanding the significant market access granted, the threat from EU 
exports, as well as declining attractiveness of the EU market, together with negatives effects 
on regional trade means the EPA may not deliver on expected gains. The agreement risks 
eroding gains made in Ghana’s industrial development in light of challenges it poses to 
competing industrial sectors. Pursuing regional agreements (ECOWAS Customs Union) 
could have delivered better results. Unless the EPA is revised to address the issues 
highlighted, Ghana stands to lose more in terms of welfare. 
Furthermore, failure of the EDF to grant any substantial aid to transcend adjustment 
means Ghana is left to deal with the numerous problems on its own. Unless aid-for-trade 
mechanisms can be implemented, with separate finances from the EDF, adjustment costs 
(effects on employment, revenue losses, etc.) negate any gains Ghana stands to make. 
However, increasing competition in the service sector, together with trade facilitation 
mechanisms under implementation promises positive gains for service trade, which 
increasingly is contributing a larger share of GDP. Taking these effects together, the EPA 
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improves the service sector, but causes significant loss to trade in goods. This together with 
revenue losses makes the agreement less beneficial to Ghana’s trade interests. 
 
 
5.3. Recommendations 
 
In line with the findings identified within this study, recommendations are made to 
different stakeholders in Ghana-EU trade relations. 
Government of Ghana – Unfettered market opening to EU imports have damaging effects to 
Ghana’s nascent industries. However, the EPA also presents unparalleled market access 
privileges that can be leveraged for growth. This calls for sustained government efforts at 
improving productive capacities of Ghanaian industries. This requires developing a long-term 
industrial strategy, targeting fast growing sectors such as the NTEs, as well as traditional 
Ghanaian exports (cocoa, minerals etc.). Identifying appropriate technology should be 
pursued, using access provided by the EPA. Also, supply side constraints regarding logistics 
etc. should be proactively addressed. In doing these, competition effects can be minimised, 
while benefitting from the vast market size the EU offers. 
The EPA in opening up the service sector through harnessing standards, as well as 
other trade facilitation measures provides opportunity for growth. Government must lead 
efforts to attract and coordinate investments opportunities, since market access alone is 
inadequate to boost growth. Thus, investment incentives including relaxed regulatory access 
and tax concessions etc. must be explored to attract investors.  
On agriculture, government needs to stimulate agricultural production through 
identifying and utilizing necessary interventions that create fundamental conditions for 
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productivity improvement. This effort needs to be complemented with improved extension, 
research and investment into the agriculture sector. 
Ghana government must further address the credit constraints facing small scale 
agriculture. This should be addressed in consultation with the banking and finance sector; as 
broader investments in this sector will not only increase direct revenues, but further aid 
reducing poverty in the sector. In line with this, current attempts to include this sector within 
the tax net should be discouraged, as it risks plunging farmers into deeper poverty. 
Investments into the sector to boost growth must precede any taxation attempts. 
Government of Ghana must be proactive in ensuring that cheap EU goods restricted 
under the MAO do not make their way into Ghana’s market through neighbouring countries. 
Thus trans-shipment and associated negative effects must be prevented. In addition to this, 
there should be a proactive market opening with regional countries, especially in light of 
negative effects of open borders on trade. Close observation of entry points is essential 
towards curtailing any negative effects of free-borders. 
Finally, there is the need to create safety nets to address employment losses and 
related effects of the EPA. Restructuring domestic productivity and associated aid to firms 
facing threats of collapse is necessary to sustain Ghana’s industrial drive. These mechanisms 
require efforts similar to SAP adjustment aids in order to transcend the EPAs negative 
effects.85 
The European Union - The EU must display greater flexibility in responding to requests for 
renegotiation of contentious issues during review periods of the EPA. This will be in the 
                                                          
 
85 The Structural Adjustment Program had an associated aid package .i.e. the Program of Action to Mitigate the 
Structural Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). A similar aid package is necessary to help individuals and firms 
suffering worst loses as a result of the EPA. 
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interest of both parties, especially the EU, since its proclivity to adopting entrenched position 
risks eroding civil society’s confidence in it as a true development partner of Ghana. 
The EU must also improve aid commitments to address challenges associated with 
tariff loss. The EDF in this vain must be revised to accommodate budgetary constraints 
facing the ACP as a whole. Furthermore, delays in disbursement of funds including the 
EDAIF must be addressed. 
Lastly, the EUs penchant to the use of threats, unrealistic negotiation deadlines and 
other bullying tactics during negotiations must be redressed. The union must take cognizance 
of the different developmental capacities of ACP countries including Ghana during 
negotiations with the EU, and realise the effects of these limitations on negotiation capacities. 
Adopting such negative tactics feeds into perceptions of the EU not concerned with 
developmental impacts of trade agreements on Ghana. 
Civil Society- Sustained debate on the effects of the EPA is necessary to draw government’s 
attention to challenges facing Ghanaian producers and exporters. However, attempt must be 
made to reduce false propaganda, with political undertones that have blurred discussions on 
the EPA. 
Civil society must further endeavour to engage relevant government sectors on trade 
and development e.g. the Select Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry, Ministry of 
Trade and Industry etc. to continue agitation and pressing for government policy frameworks 
to address constraints  of the EPA. 
ACP/ ECOWAS- Finally, the issue of Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit) 
raises new dynamics on the EPA, with likely effects on all signatory ACP countries including 
Ghana. This study was unable to explore the effects of Brexit on the EPA, especially in light 
of the fact that Brexit negotiations were ongoing at the time of writing this paper. 
Considering the fact that Ghana and Britain (as well as other ACP countries) have extensive 
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trade relations since pre-colonial era, further research is highly recommended on post- Brexit 
trade between Ghana and Britain and how it affects the EPA. This can be conducted after 
Britain concludes its exit negotiations. This study can focus on how trade relations should be 
structured, as well as concessions that should be made by both parties. 
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APPENDIX A- Ghana’s Trade with ECOWAS and EU’s Trade with Ghana 
 
 
Source: Website of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana. 
At: http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/delega
tions/ghana/eu_ghana/trade_relation/bilateral_trade/regional_trade/index_en.htm  
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Source: Website of the Delegation of the European Union to Ghana. 
At: http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/d
elegations/ghana/eu_ghana/trade_relation/bilateral_trade/index_en.htm  
APPENDIX B- (Ghana’s Exclusion List) 
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APPENDIX C (I)- Ghana –EU Trade Statistics 
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APPENDIX C (II) - Ghana –EU Trade Statistics 
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APPENDIX D- Ghana’s Trade with the World (Statistics) 
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